International Law Studies - Volume 70
Levie on the Law of War
Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green (Editors)

IV
Across The Table At Pan Mun Jom
38 Saint Louis University Magazine 10 (March 1965)*

I

n July 1951 the writer, then an Anny legal officer stationed in Tokyo, was
suddenly ordered to an undisclosed destination in Korea, for an undisclosed
purpose, for about two weeks. In view of what was being discussed at great
length over the radio and in the press, it was not difficult to conclude that the
assigned mission was to help negotiate with the North Korean and Chinese
Communists for an armistice to end fighting in Korea. One year later the writer
was the last of the original staff to return to Tokyo, and there still was no
agreement with the Communists on such an armistice. In fact, that agreement
was not reached until July, 1953, two years rather than two weeks after the
opening of the talks!
To write with purported authority on the basis ofexperiences which occurred
more than a decade ago would be presumptuous in most areas of human conduct.
Not so with respect to the negotiating techniques employed by the Communists.
In this regard they all wear the same old school tie, whether they are Russian
or Chinese, Bulgarian or North Korean. A perusal of both official and unofficial
reports concerning negotiations with Communists conducted yesterday, a year
ago, or a decade ago, will quickly reveal the use of some or all of the definitely
non-diplomatic methods early adopted by Soviet negotiators. Subsequendy they
have been developed and refined until they have become standard operating
procedure for any self-respecting Communist who is given the task of
negotiating with representatives of a "decadent" capitalistic system.
Without attempting to be a psychiatrist, it is safe to say that one of the first
things which impressed the United Nations Command (UNC) personnel at the
armistice negotiations was that, without exception, every Communist
representative, from senior delegate to substitute interpreter, suffered from an
inferiority complex. This "chip-on-the-shoulder," "I'm-as-good-as-you-are"
attitude is undoubtedly one of the many things which makes negotiations with
Communists so difficult. Perhaps Soviet successes in space and Chinese nuclear
successes will mitigate this, but psychiatrists will probably agree that a complete
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change in this mental attitude will require many more successes and a
considerable period of time.
The publicly expressed Communist opposition to the use of helicopters by
the UNC representatives was unquestionably motivated by their inability to
provide a helicopter lift for their own personnel. When the UNC put in gravel
walks around its side of the conference area at Pan Mun Jom, the Communists
immediately put in gravel walks on their side. When the UNC lined the sides
ofits walks with rocks, they lined the sides of their walks with bricks and painted
them white. When the UNC planted small fir trees in its area, they planted big
ones in theirs. When the UNC installed green sentry boxes to protect its military
police from the weather, they countered with sentry boxes for their guards which
were painted like barber poles-until jokes by the Western correspondents
caused them to reconsider and repaint. Similarly, it was undoubtedly this
inferiority complex which caused the almost hysterical demands that the UNC
negotiators stop referring to the Communist side as "North Korean
Communists" and "Chinese Communists" and give them their "rightful' names,
"Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea" and "Chinese Peoples' Volunteers."
Another characteristic which appears to be endemic among Communists is
a complete lack of a sense of humor and an accompanying marked inability to
be on the receiving end of a joke. The incident of the sentry boxes which has
just been mentioned was one example of this. Another involved a ten-year-old
Korean boy who one day followed the UNC convoy into the neutral zone. He
was arrested by the Communists who claimed that he was a spy for the United
Nations Command. The UNC liaison officers demanded and obtained his return
and the Western press treated the whole thing as a huge joke, making numerous
references to the ten-year-old "master spy." There were no further attempts by
the Communists, except behind the bamboo curtain, to capitalize on that
particular incident. Similarly, when a small anti-epidemic team of the Republic
of Korea Army inadvertendy drove its truck into the neutral zone the
Communists, in returning the men to the UNC liaison officers, labeled the
incident a "very serious violation" of the agreement creating the neutral zone.
The Western press wrote humorous stories about the "invasion of the neutral
zone by soldiers armed to the teeth with DDT spray guns," and nothing further
was heard about the matter from the Communists.
When the meetings began at Kaesong, the Communists did everything
possible to create the impression that they were the hosts and that the UNC
personnel were the visiting suppliants. Communist guards armed \vith
sub-machine guns swarmed around the entire conference area. Packages of
Chinese cigarettes and decanters of Chinese wine were on the conference table.
And the Communists attempted to dictate who could be included in the UNC
party and refused to pass a UNC convoy which included news correspondents.
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Within twenty-four hours General Matthew B. Ridgway, the UNC
Commander, ordered the conferences halted and laid down the terms upon
which he would permit them to be resumed. The Communists quickly agreed.
This was the first of a number of occasions upon which an immediate display
of a firm and irrevocable intent brought quick acquiescence from the
Communists. Not only the armed guards but the cigarettes and wine
disappeared. It is perhaps appropriate to add that none of the UNC personnel
had ever availed themselves of the Communist "hospitality" and that when,
more or less intentionally, American cigarettes were left overnight on the
conference table, they would be found untouched the following day.
Until the advent of the Communist era, the agenda was something upon
which agreement was normally reached during the first few minutes of a
diplomatic conference if not before hand. Now, reaching an agreement on the
agenda sometimes has become harder than reaching agreement on substantive
matters. This is primarily because of the Communists' attempt to trick the other
side into concessions by means of the wording on agenda items.
For example, both sides were agreed at the very outset that there should be
an item concerned with the selection of a military demarcation line, a dividing
line between the opposing military forces once the cease-fire became effective.
The UNC delegation proposed that this subject be included under the rubric
"Establishment of a military demarcation line." The Communists refused to
accept this proposed terminology, submitting as a counter-proposal the phrase
"Establishment of the thirty-eighth parallel as a military demarcation line."
Obviously, after agreement on such wording for the agenda item, there would
have been little need for substantive discussions. Any attempt to discuss locating
the military demarcation line at a point other than at the thirty-eighth parallel
would have met with an immediate complaint by the Communists that the
discussion was not within the framework of the mutually accepted agenda and
with absolute refusal to take part in negotiations which would "violate" the now
sacrosanct agenda. Here, again, the UNC refused to make any concession and
the Communists eventually accepted the UNC-proposed terminology which
thus permitted the substantive discussions to cover a whole range of suggested
demarcation lines with the battle line finally being agreed upon for that purpose.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to recall that while it took many months to get
the Communists to abandon the thirty-eighth parallel, some months thereafter,
when the UNC suggested using that line for determining which civilian refugees
would be entitled to be sent to the other side, the Communists asserted that the
UNC was attempting to revive the "obsolete" thirty-eighth parallel.
It is comparatively simple to trace the continuity over the years of the use of
the agenda technique by the Communists. The problem of China has, of course,
plagued the United Nations since early in 1950. The difference between the
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traditional approach to the establishment of an agenda item and the Communist
approach is well illustrated by the two items inscribed on the agenda of the
Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly in 1961. The item proposed by New
Zealand, worded so as to permit complete discussion ofall aspects ofthe problem,
was: "Question of the representation of China in the United Nations." The
item proposed by the USSR (which was then still acting as Communist China's
sponsor in the United Nations), was: "Restoration of the lawful rights of the
Peoples' Republic of China."
The use of tactful language in international negotiations is merely evidence
of bourgeois decadence in so far as the Communists are concerned.
(Khrushchev's shoe-pounding performance at the 1960 meeting of the United
Nations General Assembly, which so astounded most non-Communist
representatives, was probably considered to be quite normal by the
representatives of the satellite nations.) Any proposal that they made was
invariably labeled "fair and reasonable." Just as invariably, any proposal made by
the UNC was labeled "absurd and arrogant." Libelous statements about the
United States, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China were the
Communist order of the day. Every UNC action was characterized as
"barbarous" and "criminal" and every UNC statement as "deceitful" and a
"fabrication." It was obvious that all of this was part ofa strategy aimed at making
the UNC negotiators lose their tempers, the theory probably being that when
emotionally disturbed, unintended statements might be inadvertently made. But
whatever the theory, the plan failed to work as the UNC representatives, naive
as some of them may have been when the negotiations began, quickly came to
appreciate what was being attempted and had no difficulty in avoiding the pitfall
which had been so carefully prepared for them. In fact, the Communists soon
found it necessary to completely reverse their tactics and to attempt to induce
reciprocity by purported loss of temper on their side, loss of temper which could
be turned on and offlike water from a faucet. After a few polite but patently
amused requests that they stop yelling across the table, this tactic was more or
less abandoned, especially when one of the UNC staff officers pointed out that
yelling in Chinese or Korean served no useful purpose since it was in a language
he did not understand.
Major General (later General) Henry 1. Hodes, one of the original members
of the United Nations Command Delegation and the senior member of the first
UNC sub-delegation (the other was Rear Admiral Arleigh. A. Burke, later an
Admiral and Chief of Naval Operations), had a faculty for rubbing his
Communist counterpart, Chinese Major General Hsieh Fang, the wrong way.
The informal sub-delegation meetings on the military demarcation line had
come to a complete halt. After both sides had maneuvered for some time with
no perceptible progress being made, General Hodes suggested that a coin be
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tossed to detennine who would "break the ice." Hsieh Fang indicated great
astonishment that General Hodes would be willing to let such an important
matter be detennined by the toss of a coin. To him the negotiatory technique
employed was a matter of the utmost importance. General Hodes was just
interested in getting the discussions moving. On another occasion, Hsieh Fang
attempted to indicate his low regard for the United Nations Command
Delegation by referring to AdmiralJoy (almost a Chinese name) as "your Senior
Delegate, whose name I do not recall." General Hodes answered him by
referring to the Communist Senior Delegate and adding the phrase "whose name
I trust you do recall." That ended that interchange very quickly.
When the UNC negotiators had no objection to something proposed by the
Communists they would unhesitatingly so state. Not so the Communists. They
would concede that their views were generally the same as those expressed by
the UNC representative, or that they could see no reason why agreement should
not be reached on the matter under discussion. It was just plain impossible to
get them to say a simple "yes." Naturally, there was much speculation on the
UNC side that this difficulty arose because the Communist representatives were
not pennitted on their own initiative to agree on even a minor administrative
matter. No such difficulty was encountered when it came to getting them to
say "no."
Over the course of time both sides became very reticent about the manner
in which they proposed compromises. The UNC negotiators soon found that
if they offered a compromise position somewhere between the announced
positions of the two sides, the Communists would reject it out of hand, but that
for all subsequent negotiations the two extremes were the original Communist
position and the UNC compromise proposal. The UNC negotiators evened the
score when the Communists made a proposal calling for agreement to a demand
made by UNC on one matter in return for UNC agreement to a Communist
demand on an entirely unrelated matter. The UNC accepted the Communist
concession on its demand and declined to agree to the Communist demand on
the other matter. It worked-but only once.
The Communists were either amazingly unimaginative or severely restricted
when it came to administrative matters. Every suggestion without exception for
expediting the progress of the negotiations was made by the UNC
representatives. And that wasn't because they jumped the gun, either. On a
number of occasions the UNC representatives would ask the Communists for
a suggestion as to how some administrative matter should be handled. The
Communists would come right back and ask for the UNC opinion. It would
be given to them, and the next day they would agree to it, usually with some
minor and unimportant modification made just to show that they had had a
hand in reaching the decision. Incidentally, Navy Lieutenant Horace G.
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Underwood, the senior UNC interpreter, stated that he had found it necessary
to adopt the policy of intentionally inserting at least one fairly obvious error in
all interpretations on which agreement was required, because then the
Communists would be satisfied when they corrected the error, whereas, if there
was no error, they invariably proposed some change in substance. More
inferiority complex?
If any reader of this article should ever have the necessary but exhausting
chore of negotiating with representatives of a Communist nation, he
undoubtedly will encounter many of the techniques discussed here. For it is safe
to say that Communist negotiating techniques are as immutable as the laws of
nature.

